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Summary: The countries of the former Yugoslavia inherited a diffi cult 
legacy of mass atrocities and human rights abuse from the wars of the 
1990s. The European Union’s association and accession conditionality 
with respect to Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
Croatia incorporates the problem of dealing with war crimes only inso-
far as it requires full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia. While transfers of war crimes suspects 
to The Hague have dominated EU relations with the countries of the 
Western Balkans, domestic transitional justice mechanisms such as 
truth-telling inquiries and war crimes trials have been ignored by the 
international community. However, international justice remains both 
remote and heavily contested across the region, and is often used to 
radicalise nationalist sentiments instead of facilitating reconciliation 
among ethnic communities. The goals of EU conditionality in ex-Yugo-
slavia - promoting reconciliation and cross-border cooperation - can 
only be effectively advanced if mechanisms of transitional justice are 
employed at the national level, articulating truth and rebuilding the 
rule of law by establishing war crimes accountability from within.    
The May 2005 decision by European Union foreign ministers to 
postpone accession talks with Croatia due to Zagreb’s failure to hand 
over General Ante Gotovina to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) came as part of a wave of EU pressure for 
cooperation with the Tribunal across the former Yugoslavia. Despite the 
fact that Gotovina is now in The Hague, and governments have shown in-
tensifi ed cooperation with the court, ICTY rhetoric continues to be widely 
rejected across the region. This paper analyses EU association and ac-
cession conditionality in the Western Balkans with respect to the legacy 
of mass atrocities inherited from the wars of the 1990s. First, it examines 
the current EU political conditionality in Croatia, Serbia and Montene-
gro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has effectively reduced the war 
crimes issue to full cooperation with the ICTY. It then turns to the proc-
ess of transitional justice in the region’s post-confl ict societies, assess-
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ing its tensions and shortcomings. Finally, it argues that EU war crimes 
conditionality, by focusing exclusively on cooperation with the ICTY, has 
failed to facilitate the process of rebuilding the rule of law in the former 
Yugoslavia and to advance the goals of international justice: defusing 
ethnic tensions and promoting reconciliation in the region. 
I. EU Conditionality in the Western Balkans: Political Criteria and 
the ICTY
The EU association and accession conditionality for the Western 
Balkan countries comprises two sets of criteria. The fi rst are the political, 
economic and institutional criteria established for all candidate countries 
by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993; the political criteria were 
defi ned as “[the] stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities”.1 With the ex-
ception of “protection of minorities”, the Treaty of Amsterdam confi rmed 
these criteria, incorporating them in Articles 6 and 49 of the Treaty on the 
European Union.2 The second set of criteria is specifi c to the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP) for South East Europe established by the 
Commission Communication of 26 May 1999,3 and includes, inter alia, 
full cooperation with the ICTY, respect for human and minority rights, 
the creation of real opportunities for the return of refugees and internally 
displaced persons, and a visible commitment to regional cooperation.4  
Cooperation with the ICTY has proved the most diffi cult issue in the 
SAP context, and has dominated the EU’s external relations agenda with 
all three countries. The European Council, while affi rming that the future 
of the Western Balkans lies within the EU, has repeatedly insisted that 
progress towards association and eventual EU accession be conditioned 
on full cooperation with the ICTY.5 In its 2004 Annual Report on the SAP, 
the Commission concluded that cooperation with the ICTY by countries 
in the region had generally remained insuffi cient.6 The closer a country 
moves towards opening accession negotiations, the greater the pressure 
on it to transfer indicted war crimes suspects to The Hague becomes, 
with ever more serious consequences for its failure to comply.
1 European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency, Bull EU 6-1993, Pt. 
I.13. See also Manfred Nowak, ‘Human Rights “Conditionality” in Relation to Entry to and 
Full Participation in the EU’ in Phillip Alston with Mara Bustelo and James Heenan (eds), 
The EU and Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 1999) 691-692. 
2 The Amsterdam Treaty of 2 October 1997 entered into force on 1 May 1999. 
3 Commission Communication [1999] COM (1999) 235, Bull EU 5-1999, Pt. 1.3.73.
4 See European Council Conclusions on Conditionality [1997] Bull EU 4-1997, Pt. 2.2.1.
5 See e.g., Bull EU 1/2-2003, Pt. 1.6.102; Bull EU 6-2004, Pt. I.7.31. 
6 European Commission 2004 Annual Report [2004] COM (2004) 202/2.
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So far, Croatia has made the greatest progress towards membership 
in the Union. Following the January 2000 parliamentary elections and 
Stjepan MesiÊ’s election as president of the Republic of Croatia in Febru-
ary 2000, growing consensus on Croatia’s European future triggered a 
rapid development of its relations with the EU. In May 2000, the Commis-
sion adopted a Feasibility Report7 proposing the opening of negotiations 
for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which was signed 
on 29 October 2001 and has been governing EU-Croatia relations prior 
to accession.8 Pending ratifi cation of the SAA, an Interim Agreement was 
signed and entered into force on 1 March 2002.9 In December 2004, the 
European Council noted that progress was satisfactory and, on the condi-
tion that Croatia’s remaining ICTY indictee, General Ante Gotovina, would 
be handed over, it decided to open accession negotiations with Croatia on 
17 March 2005.10 After intensive last-minute discussions on the country’s 
failure to deliver General Gotovina, the Council decided on 16 March 2005 
to postpone the opening of negotiations with Croatia.11 While reaffi rming 
its commitment to Croatia’s accession to the EU, the Council deferred 
negotiations until full cooperation with the ICTY was achieved. In October 
2005 the EU resumed negotiations with the country after ICTY Chief Pros-
ecutor Carla Del Ponte reported that Croatia was now cooperating fully 
with the Tribunal.12 Two months later, General Gotovina was arrested in 
the Canary Islands and transferred to The Hague.13 
News of Croatia’s suspended negotiations helped intensify efforts for 
compliance with ICTY conditionality in both Serbia and Montenegro and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. By June 2005, Belgrade had transferred most 
of its at-large indictees to The Hague or persuaded them to surrender, 
including Generals LukiÊ and PavkoviÊ, whom it had previously insisted 
on prosecuting in domestic courts.14 After the emergence of a videotape 
7 European Commission Flexibility Report [2000] COM (2000) 311.
8 See the Proposal of the Commission [2001] COM (2001) 371.
9 Council Decision concerning the signing on behalf of the Community and provisional 
application of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade related matters between the Eu-
ropean Community on the one part, and the Republic of Croatia, on the other [2001] OJ 
2001 L330/1.
10 Bull EU 12-2004, Pts. I.6.14 to I.6.16.
11 Bull EU 3-2005, Pt. I.5.1.
12 Press Release, Council of the EU 12514/1/05 REV 1 (Presse 241) 4 October 2005.
13 The Guardian reported that the Croatian authorities had supplied ICTY investigators 
with information leading to the arrest. Shortly after receiving this information, Del Ponte 
announced that Croatia was cooperating fully with the Tribunal. Ian Traynor and Giles 
Tremlett, ‘Capture of War Crimes Suspect Paves Croatia’s Way to EU Entry’, The Guardian 
(London, 9 December 2005). 
14 Ian Traynor, ‘Full House for The Hague’s War Crimes Unit’, The Guardian (London 9 June 
2005). See also ICTY Press Releases JP/MOW/957e, 4 April 2005, and JP/MOW/966e, 25 
April 2005 <http://www.un.org/icty>
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showing Serbian soldiers killing Bosnian Muslims, the government an-
nounced plans to hand over Ratko MladiÊ and Radovan KaradžiÊ, the two 
men currently heading the ICTY’s most-wanted list.15 Serbia desperately 
needs to demonstrate consistent compliance, as the Commission ap-
proved a Feasibility Report in May 2005 giving the green light to signing 
an SAA.16 At the time of writing, the EU had terminated negotiations with 
the country pending the arrest of MladiÊ. Similarly, in its assessment of 
progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Commission declared that the 
requirement of full cooperation with the ICTY, particularly in the case of 
Republika Srpska, had to be met before it could recommend conclud-
ing an SAA.17 The External Relations Council reaffi rmed this position in 
January 2005.18
II. Transitional Justice in the Former Yugoslavia
With EU conditionality focusing exclusively on cooperation with the 
ICTY, the wider process of transitional justice in the post-confl ict socie-
ties of former Yugoslavia has been largely ignored by the international 
community. Domestically, transitional justice has been characterised by 
a lack of genuine reckoning with the past and the widespread denial of 
atrocities committed on “our” side of the confl ict, as well as persistent 
ethnic bias in the administration of justice. 
Despite differing institutional structures for dealing with the past 
and a differing balance of victims and perpetrators, there are some im-
portant features common to the process of transitional justice in all the 
post-confl ict countries of ex-Yugoslavia. Nowhere is the past confronted 
openly, in an inclusive process of truth-telling that would involve both 
state inquiries into the confl icts and personal accounts of them. Domestic 
war crimes trials fail to address the scale of the atrocities, while courts do 
not administer even-handed justice to war crimes suspects under their 
jurisdiction, without regard to ethnic and national affi liation. In this con-
text, inter-ethnic and cross-border relations continue to be jeopardised 
by mutual grievances and tensions, diminishing the possibility for genu-
ine reconciliation and cooperation across ethnic and national divides.
15 BBC News, 3 June 2005, ‘Serbian Leader “Shocked” by Video’ <http://www.news.bbc.
co.uk>
16 European Commission Feasibility Report [2005] COM (2005) 476; SEC (2005) 478.
17 Report from the Commission to the Council on the preparedness of Bosnia and Herze-
govina to negotiate a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union 
[2003] COM (2003) 692.
18 Press Release, Council of the EU 5535/05 (Presse 15) 31 January 2005.
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A. State Responsibility for Genocide and Aggression
In March 1993 Bosnia and Herzegovina instituted proceedings be-
fore the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against what was then Yu-
goslavia, claiming violations of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.19 In its application, Bosnia 
requested that the Court declare that Yugoslavia, through its agents and 
surrogates, inter alia, had killed, illegally detained and exterminated citi-
zens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, calling on it to immediately terminate 
the practice of “ethnic cleansing” and pay reparations. Croatia instituted 
similar genocide proceedings against Yugoslavia in 1999, seeking to es-
tablish liability for ethnic cleansing and extensive destruction of prop-
erty.20 In their applications, both Bosnia and Croatia have also referred 
to alleged aggression by Yugoslavia in the course of the confl icts. Pending 
adjudication by the ICJ on the merits of these cases, the disputes ar-
ticulated in international legal proceedings effectively preclude any con-
structive engagement by governments in the ex-Yugoslav countries, while 
contested narratives of genocide and aggression only serve to reinforce 
ethno-nationalist sentiments in the region. 
B. Truth-Telling 
Offi cial efforts aimed at truth-telling have notoriously failed in Ser-
bia, largely because they were motivated by political expediency rather 
than a genuine will to revisit the past. The Yugoslav Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission (TRC) was established in 2001 by a decision of then-
President Vojislav Koštunica,21 without public debate or consultation 
with Parliament. The commission’s mandate was to address the causes 
of the confl icts, as opposed to uncovering new facts about hostilities and 
atrocities.22 The lack of a minority representation, resignations by key 
members, and scarce resources added to the problems facing the TRC, 
which ultimately failed to disclose any new information, becoming both 
dysfunctional and irrelevant by 2003. 
While no offi cial war crimes inquiry was ever initiated in Croatia, 
in the Bosnian Federation the popular belief that truth commissions al-
19 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Application, 20 March 
1993 <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ibhy/ibhyframe.htm>
20 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Croatia v. Serbia and Montenegro)), Application, 2 July 1999 <http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/icry/icryframe.htm>
21 Offi cial Gazette of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ‘Decision on the Establishment of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ (no. 15/2001, 30 March 2001).
22 See Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Basic Program Document, 15 January 2002 
<http://www.komisija.org/osnova.html> 
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low war criminals to go unpunished kept the idea of establishing such 
a body on the shelf despite years of deliberation.23 The only truth-tell-
ing initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains the Commission for 
Investigation of the Events in and around Srebrenica between 10 and 
19 July 1995 (the Srebrenica Commission), which was established by 
the National Assembly of Republika Srpska in December 2003. Follow-
ing signifi cant pressure from High Representative Paddy Ashdown and 
the concurrent vetting of uncooperative offi cials, the Commission’s Oc-
tober 2004 report admitted to the massacre of more than 7,000 Bosnian 
Muslims at Srebrenica in 1995, disclosing the locations of 32 previously 
unknown mass graves. Arguably, this constitutes dramatic progress by 
the Bosnian Serbs towards acknowledging responsibility. Yet many in the 
Bosnian-Croat Federation have dismissed the Commission’s work as the 
result of international pressure, without genuine remorse and concern 
for the victims, thus severely limiting its impact on reconciliation. 
C. Domestic War Crimes Trials
National judiciaries in ex-Yugoslavia have dealt with the issue of 
war crimes rather reluctantly, failing to provide accountability for most 
of the atrocities or justice for the majority of the victims. Five years after 
the regime change, courts in Serbia have completed only a handful of 
trials, prosecuting mainly low-level paramilitaries and rank-and-fi le sol-
diers, while rejecting the doctrine of command responsibility in principle. 
A special War Crimes Chamber of the Belgrade District Court began its 
work in April 2004 with the OvËara case, concerning the massacre of 290 
Croatian civilians captured in a Vukovar hospital in 1991. The success of 
this and future trials depends on tackling systemic problems such as a 
lack of adequate witness protection and insuffi cient vetting of offi cials in 
the police and judiciary, as well as the generally reluctant attitude of the 
public and the government alike.24 
Croatia has largely failed to deliver even-handed justice, despite the 
signifi cant number of war crimes cases processed by its courts. There 
has been a deluge of cases involving war crimes prosecutions of Serbs 
in absentia, compromising the rule of law through selectivity and bias. 
Bosnia’s local justice record is even bleaker, as politicised judiciaries and 
ethnic bias preclude any accountability for war crimes. Thus Republika 
Srpska has conducted only two war crimes trials so far.25 Disillusioned 
23 See Mark Freeman, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina: Selected Developments in Transitional 
Justice’ (ICTJ Case Studies Series (2004)) <http://www.ictj.org>
24 See Mark Freeman, ‘Serbia and Montenegro: Selected Developments in Transitional Jus-
tice’ (ICTJ Case Studies Series (2004)) <http://www.ictj.org>
25 For the MatanoviÊ case, see Humanitarian Law Center (Belgrade) Press Release, 20 March 
2005, ‘First War Crimes Trial in Republika Srpska’ <http://www.hlc.org.yu> 
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with the progress of domestic prosecutions, the international adminis-
tration in Bosnia and Herzegovina has placed its hopes in the recently-
established special War Crimes Chamber of the State Court,26 which is 
expected to handle some of the backlog and deal with cases which might 
be transferred from the ICTY.
III. Limits of the EU’s ICTY Conditionality
The EU’s insistence on ICTY conditionality springs from a conviction 
that the Tribunal is a key factor in rebuilding the rule of law following 
armed confl ict in the Western Balkans, ending impunity for international 
crimes and facilitating reconciliation across the region.27 As an exercise 
in international legalism, the ICTY was established with the promise of 
promoting peace by dismantling the ethno-nationalist ideologies which 
had been reinforced during the confl icts in ex-Yugoslavia.28 An important 
aspect of the Tribunal’s mandate was to punish those individuals who 
were most responsible for the atrocities, thereby precluding notions of 
collective responsibility and guilt by association. In this sense, the EU 
has adopted the view of many international lawyers that “judicialisation” 
of the truth about individual crimes and perpetrators, delivered in impar-
tial proceedings at the international level, would challenge the region’s 
collectivist ideologies, deter future confl ict, and facilitate reconciliation 
across ethnic divides.29
Having functioned for more than a decade, and faced with a 2010 
completion strategy, the ICTY has largely failed to live up to its promise of 
individualising guilt and fostering reconciliation. In Serbia, its mandate 
of prosecuting those most responsible for excesses in the confl icts is re-
garded as a collective and disproportional punishment of Serbs, as their 
numbers in different stages of ICTY proceedings are signifi cantly larger 
than the total number of Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albani-
The second trial dealing with crimes committed in the ManjaËa camp is to commence in 
2006. B92 News, 15 December 2005, ‘War Crimes Suspects Arrested in Republika Srpska’ 
<http://www.b92.net>
26 Agreement between the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the Establishment of Registry of Section I for War Crimes, Organised Crime, 
Economic Crime and Corruption of the Criminal and Appellate Divisions of the Court of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Special Department for War Crimes, Organised Crime, 
Economic Crime and Corruption of the Prosecutor’s Offi ce of Bosnia and Herzegovina (on 
fi le with the author). 
27 Report by the Commission on the SAP in South East Europe (n 6).
28 For a summary of the arguments in favour of international prosecutions, see Antonio 
Cassese, ‘Refl ections on International Criminal Justice’ (1998) 61 Modern L. Rev. 1. 
29 On the currency of the argument that international justice serves to defuse ethnic ten-
sions, see Jose Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’ (1999) 24 
Yale J. of Int’l L. 365, p. 436.
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ans. Beyond this “ethnic calculus”, even moderates in Serbia perceive the 
fact that MiloševiÊ was prosecuted in The Hague, while other major vil-
lains of the wars, such as Croatia’s Franjo Tudjman, were never indicted, 
as an attempt to distort the historical record of the last decade and put 
all the blame on the Serbian side. Instead of facilitating political transi-
tion and the process of rebuilding the rule of law by dealing with the past, 
the ICTY trials have been utilised by nationalist forces to demonstrate the 
persistent victimisation of Serbs and to radicalise Serbian politics.30
Distant and complex, the Tribunal’s proceedings often fail to reso-
nate with the local public or provide closure for the victims, even in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. Despite its substantial jurisprudence concerning 
crimes against Bosnian Muslims, it was not until April 2004 that the 
ICTY Appeals Chamber confi rmed, in its judgment in the KrstiÊ case, 
that genocide had indeed been committed in Srebrenica in 1995.31 Some 
of the practices adopted by the Court, such as accepting guilty pleas or 
taking mitigating circumstances into account, have been condemned by 
organisations of victims and their families for compromising justice in the 
name of expediency. Thus, when the former co-president of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Biljana PlavšiÊ, pleaded guilty, expressing her remorse and 
calling for reconciliation, the effect of her public apology on Bosnian Mus-
lims was signifi cantly diminished by the plea bargain she had obtained 
and the lenient sentence that followed.32 
Finally, Croatia’s uneasy cooperation with the Tribunal has pro-
duced little reconciliation with the past. The Croatian public’s continued 
perception of convicted war criminals as heroes was made clear when 
Bosnian Croat general Tihomir BlaškiÊ returned to Croatia after being 
prosecuted by the ICTY for war crimes committed in Central Bosnia in 
1993. Despite the fact that BlaškiÊ was cleared of most of the charges on 
appeal, the ICTY Appeals Chamber sentenced him to nine years impris-
onment for abusing detainees.33 The time he had already served in cus-
tody was taken into account, allowing BlaškiÊ to return home shortly af-
ter judgment was rendered. His arrival at Zagreb Airport in August 2004 
was greeted by euphoric crowds singing patriotic wartime hymns, and he 
was received with honours by the Croatian authorities. The status of a 
war hero was awarded to BlaškiÊ not because the most serious charges 
were dropped, but rather despite their being dropped. It is diffi cult to fi nd 
30 Iavor Rangelov, ‘International Law and Local Ideology in Serbia’ (2004) 16 Peace Rev. 331, 
at pp. 331-334.
31 The Prosecutor v. Radislav KrstiÊ, 19 April 2004, case no. IT-98-33-A, ¶¶ 5-38.
32 The Prosecutor v. Biljana PlavšiÊ, 27 February 2003, case no. IT-00-39&40/1.
33 The Prosecutor v. Tihomir BlaškiÊ, 29 July 2004, case no. IT-95-14-A.
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a better illustration of the widespread denial of ICTY rhetoric in Croatia 
and the limits of reconciliation in the region.34
I have argued elsewhere that the ICTY’s failure to aid post-confl ict 
societies in overcoming inter-ethnic distrust and nationalist politics de-
rives from a tension between the liberal individualist bias of international 
law and the collectivist ideology of ethnic nationalism associated with 
mass atrocity in the former Yugoslavia.35 Liberal international lawyers 
uphold individual agency and responsibility in an attempt to avoid col-
lective responsibility and guilt by association,36 thus prosecuting the top 
perpetrators and implicitly exonerating ethno-national communities. 
This international legal paradigm has been criticised for allowing its lib-
eral bias to sideline ethnicity, as is evident in such choices as a “dena-
tionalised” bench, ethnic neutrality in handling evidentiary issues, and 
ignoring local calls for ethnic balance in the trials.37 
The nature of mass atrocity in an ethnic confl ict is, however, more 
collective than international criminal law is ready to admit. The war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide prosecuted by 
the ICTY were committed mainly by members of one ethnic group against 
individuals who were targeted precisely because they belonged to a rival 
ethnic group.38 Crimes against humanity are, by defi nition, committed as 
part of an attack on a civilian population;39 in the wars in former Yugo-
slavia, this meant attacking civilians from the enemy ethnic community. 
War crimes were often committed as part of larger campaigns of ethnic 
cleansing, hence the Tribunal’s practice of prosecuting them as crimes 
against humanity as well.40 Finally, the “group” nature of genocide has 
34 Ivan Zvonimir »iËak, ‘Heroes and Criminals’ in Strategy for Transitional Justice in former 
Yugoslavia (2005) Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center, pp. 152-158. More recently, the 
arrest of General Gotovina provoked nationalist protests and huge press across Croatia. 
BBC News, 11 December 2005, ‘Massive Rally for Croatia Suspect’; BBC News, 9 December 
2005, ‘Press Show Sympathy for Gotovina’, both <http://www.news.bbc.co.uk>
35 Rangelov (n 30) 334-337. For a critique arguing that liberal legality is not an obstacle to 
confronting mass atrocity and proposing a collective sanctions approach, see Mark Osiel, 
‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives against Mass Atrocity’ (2005) 105 Columbia L. J. 
1751, pp. 1837-1859.
36 See George Fletcher, ‘The Storrs Lectures. Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem 
of Collective Guilt’ (2002) 111 Yale L. J. 1499.
37 Alvarez (n 29) 436-451. 
38 Rangelov (n 30) 335.
39 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Se-
rious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Former Yugoslavia 
since 1991 (adopted 25 May 1993), reprinted in International Tribunal for the Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed 
in the Former Yugoslavia since 1991: Basic Documents, Sales no. E/F/95.III.PI (hereinafter 
ICTY Statute), Art 5.
40 See, for example, the treatment of “murder” in the context of the 1998-1999 Serb at-
tacks on Kosovo Albanians, as both a crime against humanity and a violation of the laws 
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been codifi ed in the ICTY Statute itself, which requires the establishment 
of a special intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial 
or religious group as such.41 
If the crimes prosecuted by the ICTY demonstrate a signifi cant col-
lective dimension, their relation to the collectivist ideology of ethnic na-
tionalism cannot be so easily avoided by a liberal insistence on individual 
criminal responsibility. The salience of group ethnicity in these confl icts 
persists across the former Yugoslavia, where ICTY proceedings are per-
ceived locally not as punishing individuals, but as punishing the nation. 
Therefore, the goals of establishing the truth about mass atrocities and 
achieving closure and reconciliation across ethnic and national divides 
should also be pursued via transitional justice mechanisms at the na-
tional level, as these cannot be as easily rejected by the local public. Do-
mestic truth-telling processes could play an important role in challeng-
ing denial by exposing the human dimension of atrocities and triggering 
shock and empathy with the victims, without risking a priori dismissal 
as illegitimate. Similarly, domestic war crimes trials could be effective in 
rebuilding the rule of law from within, since delivering justice counters 
a culture of impunity while allowing recognition of the victims’ suffering 
where it matters most - in the very institutions that embody the perpetra-
tor community as such. 
Instead of using its leverage in the association and accession proc-
ess to encourage the establishment of local tools for accountability, the 
EU has adopted an unnecessarily narrow understanding of transitional 
justice with respect to the former Yugoslavia.42 By focusing exclusively on 
full cooperation with the ICTY, EU conditionality in the Western Balkans 
may have ignored domestic transitional justice to the detriment of its own 
purported goals: intensifi ed regional cooperation and respect for the rule 
of law. Furthermore, had domestic transitional justice processes taken 
root in each of the relevant countries, the ICTY’s chances of fulfi lling its 
praiseworthy mandate of reconciliation would have been greater. Truth-
telling and domestic justice may be the conditions which need to obtain 
fi rst in Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia in 
order for international justice to become locally relevant as intended.   
and customs of war, in The Prosecutor v. Slobodan MiloševiÊ et al, Kosovo: Second Amended 
Indictment, 29 October 2001, case no. IT-99-37-PT, ¶¶ 53-61, 65-66.
41 ICTY Statute, Art 4(2). 
42 On the wide range of transitional justice mechanisms available to post-confl ict societies, 
see UNGA ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Post-Confl ict Societies’ (2004) UN Doc S/2004/616.
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IV. Conclusion
Rebuilding the rule of law in the countries of the former Yugoslavia 
is conditioned on dealing with the diffi cult legacy of the armed confl icts 
of the 1990s. The EU’s conditionality with respect to Croatia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro has narrowly interpreted the 
Copenhagen political criteria in the SAP, focusing exclusively on full coop-
eration with the ICTY while ignoring domestic mechanisms for transition-
al justice. By excluding local truth-telling processes and war crimes trials 
from its association and accession conditionality, the EU has missed an 
important opportunity to encourage the region’s governments and socie-
ties to acknowledge and deal with mass atrocities committed during the 
confl icts. Ignoring domestic transitional justice processes has allowed 
the persistence of ethno-nationalist ideologies and denial of responsibil-
ity for war crimes, thus obstructing both the process of rebuilding the 
rule of law and international justice’s goal of facilitating lasting peace 
and reconciliation in the Western Balkans. As the ex-Yugoslav countries 
move closer to the Union, and the EU’s leverage in negotiations increases, 
taking this lesson seriously might be the key to maximising the impact of 
EU conditionality as a positive force for transition in the region. 
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